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We explore how the mechanics of collective decision-making, especially of jury deliberation, can be
inferred from macroscopic statistics. We first hypothesize that the dynamics of competing opinions
can leave a “fingerprint” in the joint distribution of final votes and time to reach a decision. We
probe this hypothesis by modeling jury datasets from different states collected in different years
and identifying which of the models best explains opinion dynamics in juries. In our best-fit model,
individual jurors have a “herding” tendency to adopt the majority opinion of the jury, but as
the amount of time they have held their current opinion increases, so too does their resistance to
changing their opinion (what we call “increasing stubbornness”). By contrast, other models without
increasing stubbornness, or without herding, create poorer fits to data. Our findings suggest that
both stubbornness and herding play an important role in collective decision-making.
What mechanisms underlie collective decision-making?
Recent research into opinion dynamics has compared sta-
tistical patterns in empirical data to models of opin-
ion dynamics [1–8] and tested how opinions change in
controlled experimental settings [9, 10]. Although both
methods have provided substantial insight extending the
early studies of collective opinion dynamics [11, 12], they
have generally not tackled one question our paper aims to
answer: how do non-consensus decisions occur [13]? For
example, is it possible to distinguish influence from non-
influence when we observe group opinions [14, 15]? In
other words, if members of a group share the same opin-
ion, can we tell if they arrived at that opinion indepen-
dently or as a result of their interactions (e.g., through
a tendency to “follow” or imitate one another)? If this
kind of influence does plays a role, why do opinions often
remain in non-consensus?
In this paper, we probe these questions by studying
jury deliberation. Our work compliments previous re-
search where judicial rulings were found to be affected
by factors unrelated to the specific cases [16]. By ana-
lyzing jury data in bulk, we aim to understand how the
mechanisms of jury opinion formation not directly related
to the facts of the case (such as influence and stubborn-
ness) couple together with the laws defining hung juries
(situations in which jury opinions are considered too di-
vided to reach a verdict) to shape decision-making pat-
terns observed in data. Furthermore, while groups are
thought to create better decisions than single individuals
[10, 17–19], a recent model suggests that correlated juror
decisions undermine their collective accuracy [20], a con-
clusion supported by experiments on crowd wisdom [10].
We have found that there are significant correlations be-
tween decisions (see Fig. 13), which, together with the
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previous model [20], may help explain why juries appear
to perform worse than individual judges at correctly ac-
quitting defendants [21]. We are therefore motivated to
understand the mechanisms that drive these correlations,
which may point to ways in which the quality of jury de-
cisions can be improved.
FEATURES OF THE DATA
Jury deliberation is an ideal test bed for models of
opinion dynamics. Jurors are exposed to the same infor-
mation during the trial, are instructed not to discuss the
trial with non-jurors, and cannot learn about the trial
from outside sources [22–26], therefore opinion variation
between jurors is likely due to internal factors, such as in-
fluence instead of external factors, such as varying levels
of information.
In this paper, we model jury datasets for civil trials
in Oregon (OR) [27] and California (CA) [28]. We find
qualitatively similar behavior in the Washington (WA)
and Nebraska (NE) datasets whose data is less complete
[29, 30] (Fig. 1), and for criminal trials in the OR dataset
(see Fig. 8). We split data by the number of jurors in
each case. The OR 6 dataset, for example, corresponds
to the Oregon civil trials with six jurors.
The purpose of our modeling efforts is to explain four
features of the data shown in Fig. 1. First, we aim to
model why the mean deliberation time, 〈Tdelib〉, is lowest
when the fraction of jurors voting for the plaintiff in the
final vote, V fp/N is 0 or 1, and highest when V
f
p/N ≈ 0.3
or V fp/N ≈ 0.6 (Fig. 1a). For each trial, we look at the
break down between for-plaintiff and for-defendant votes.
We also normalize the number of jurors voting for the
plaintiff in the final vote, V fp , by the jury size, N . Juries
are dismissed and a new trial is given to the defendant in
a civil trial if 1− φ < V fp/N < φ, where φ is 0.75 for the
2OR and CA civil trials [27, 31]. This property, observed
across all N , also helps explain why juries tend to reach
supermajorities, in which V fp/N ≥ φ or V
f
p/N ≤ 1 − φ
(Fig. 1c). We also observe that 〈Tdelib〉 scales with the
trial time, Ttrial, as 〈Tdelib〉 ∼ (Ttrial)
1/2 (Fig. 1b), a
property not strongly correlated with the final vote (Fig.
12), even though both affect the mean deliberation time.
Interestingly, the mean deliberation time does not scale
strongly with the number of jurors, which is counter to
many intuitive models (Fig. 11) [32, 33]. Finally, in Fig.
1d, we notice that deliberation time distribution is heavy-
tailed.
In this paper, we fit empirical joint distributions of fi-
nal votes and deliberation times to model distributions
through maximum likelihood estimation of model param-
eters, therefore, counter-intuitively, we infer opinion dy-
namics without access to time-series data. Recent work,
however, has shown that different dynamical models of
group opinion formation create different distributions in
the time for groups to reach consensus [34, 35], which in-
spires us to reverse engineer the model that best matches
the jury data. By matching the joint distribution in-
stead of either distribution alone strongly limits the pos-
sible dynamical models that can explain the data. For
example, in contrast to many models of group decision-
making, juries rarely reach complete agreement before
they stop deliberating, therefore it may be possible to
match the deliberation time alone with unrealistic mod-
els, in which all jurors reach agreement. We do not claim,
however, that the models we present are the only possible
models that can match the data well, but are instead sim-
ple models that illustrate mechanisms that drive opinion
dynamics.
A major limitation in the data, however, is that no two
trials are exactly the same, therefore aggregating over
heterogeneous trials may strongly affect our results [36].
To test for this effect, we split data into more homogenous
groups with the same N and similar Ttrial, because N af-
fects V fp and Ttrial affects 〈Tdelib〉. We find, however, that
splitting the data does not affect the qualitative behav-
ior of V fp/N , and Tdelib (E.g., see Fig. 1). These results
so far suggest that heterogeneity should not significantly
affects our findings.
We next introduce three null models, in which jurors
reach their opinions independently, then six models in-
corporating influence, though herding behavior and indi-
vidual stubbornness, and discuss how well each matches
the data.
NULL MODELS
We first create an independent, random vote null
model with which to compare other models. For this
first model, for each dataset, we reshuffle all juror votes,
which creates a binomial distribution of final votes. Not
surprisingly, this “one-mode null model” fits data poorly;
therefore we propose a slightly more nuanced “two-mode
FIG. 1. Data attributes. (a) The mean deliberation time
peaks when the V fp/N ≈ 0.3 and 0.6, where V
f
p/N is the frac-
tion of jurors voting for the plaintiff. (b) The mean delib-
eration time scales as (Ttrial)
1/2 across several datasets, even
though Ttrial correlates only weakly with V
f
p/N (Fig. 12). (c)
The distribution of V fp/N shows peaks when V
f
p/N ≥ φ or
V fp/N ≤ 1−φ, where φ = 0.75, the thresholds between which
juries hang [27, 31]. (d) The complimentary cumulative dis-
tribution of deliberation times is heavy-tailed across datasets.
Data is taken from Oregon [27], California [28], Washington,
and Nebraska [29, 30], and error bars represent 90% confi-
dence intervals in the mean.
null model.” For this, we split the jury data into those
with majority for-plaintiff final votes (V fp/N > 0.5) and
the rest (V fp/N ≤ 0.5), reshuffle juror votes of each subset
separately, and then combine the distributions. In both
cases, we fix P (Tdelib|V
f
p/N), the conditional probability
for juries to stop deliberating at time Tdelib, given the
fraction of for-plaintiff votes in the final vote, V fp/N , to
exactly match the empirical data, as an unrealistic but
best-case scenario of these null models. Both models pro-
duce poor fits of the data compared to other models (Fig.
2e, 4, & 8), with the exception of CA 12 (Ttrial = 34− 61
hours) in which the two-mode model fits data better than
any influence model. Overall, however, a simple model
in which opinions are picked at random, independently
of each other, does not provide a compelling explanation
of the data.
We also create a “two-timescale” null model of the de-
liberation time distribution, in which the time for each
juror to make their pre-determined final decision is in-
dependent (exponentially distributed), but depends on
whether their decision is for the plaintiff or not (hence
“two-timescale”). Deliberation ends when the last juror
makes their final decision. Separate fitting parameters
are used for for-plaintiff and for-defendant votes because
for-plaintiff votes usually take longer than for-defendant
ones (p-value < 2× 10−2 based on the Mann-Whitney U
3FIG. 2. Example fits of the influence model compared to
null models: one- and two-mode models where each juror’s
vote is reshuffled within a set of votes, and the two-timescale
model. (a) Pr(V fp/N) versus V
f
p/N , (b) Pr(T ≥ Tdelib) versus
Tdelib, and (c) 〈Tdelib〉 versus V
f
p/N .
test for CA 6, CA12, OR 6, and OR 12 datasets, no sig-
nificant difference for the CA 8 dataset), and it allows for
this null model to better agree with the data. We deter-
mined distributions by Monte Carlo sampling 105 times
for each V fp such that P (V
f
p/N) is fixed to be the em-
pirical data distribution as a best-case scenario. In this
way, the two-timescale null model is meant to explain
how juries stop deliberating, not how they reach their
final vote. We find, however, that this model creates a
poorer fit to the observed data than the full influence
model (to be discussed shortly), despite artificially fix-
ing P (V fp/N). While other plausible time distributions
could be used and the assumption of a homogeneous dis-
tribution might not be ideal, disagreement between this
idealized model and data point to limitations in similar
null models.
INFLUENCE MODELS
Full model
Given the relatively poor performance of the null
models, we propose an “influence with increasing stub-
bornness” model that can better describe the datasets.
Within the large space of plausible models, we focus on
a simple model with few parameters, and then check
whether any of these parameters could be removed with-
out affecting the quality of the fit. Furthermore, we focus
on a model with herding because of the correlations be-
tween juror opinions seen in the data (Fig. 13), which
may suggest that jurors have a tendency to follow the ma-
jority opinion. In the model, jurors tend to adopt the ma-
jority opinion and juries end deliberation at a rate that
depends on the current vote (number of jurors currently
leaning for the plaintiff and for the defendant). The for-
mer incorporates a simple mechanism for juror influence
that enables the supermajorities observed in data, while
the latter captures jury resistance to hung conditions. In
addition, we add a stubbornness property, in which ju-
rors increasingly hold on to their current opinion. This
facilitates the strong non-consensus patterns from data.
More specifically, as shown in Fig. 3, at each timestep in
the model (where a timestep is chosen to be 1 minute,
see Methods), a random juror is selected and considers
re-evaluating their current opinion with probability 1−s,
where s reflects their stubbornness and depends on how
long they’ve held their current opinion. If they do re-
evaluate, they pick the majority opinion with probability
p, and the minority with probability 1− p. At the end of
each timestep, the jury stops deliberating with probabil-
ity q, which depends on the current set of juror opinions.
The stubbornness probability s, depends both on how
long the juror has held their current opinion and whether
the current set of opinions meet the hung condition:
s =
τ/∆t∑
i=0
µeff(t0 + i∆t)∆t, (1)
where t0 is the time a juror adopted its most recent opin-
ion, τ is the time a juror has held their current opinion,
∆t is the length of a simulation time step, and µeff(t) is
the rate jurors become more stubborn:
µeff(t) =
{
µ
Vp(t)
N ≤ 1− φ,
Vp(t)
N ≥ φ
fµ 1− φ <
Vp(t)
N < φ
, (2)
where f is the reduction in this rate when juries are hung
(the current vote, Vp(t), divided by N is between the jury
hanging thresholds 1− φ and φ). If we set the stubborn-
ness probability s to a constant, that would only have the
general affect of changing the timescale of the dynam-
ics. We incorporate increasing stubbornness (s grows
with τ) as a behavioral hypothesis, which has previously
been shown to help explain voter behavior in elections
[8, 37]. The jury’s tendency to reach a non-hung decision
is captured by making the stubbornness rate µeff(t) lower
under hung conditions, meaning that jurors do not hold
onto their opinions as strongly as they would otherwise,
presumably to lessen the probability that the jury hangs.
At the end of each timestep, the probability for a jury
to stop deliberating, q, is determined:
q =
{
q0 + α|
Vp(t)
N − 1/2|
Vp(t)
N ≤ 1− φ,
Vp(t)
N ≥ φ
q0 1− φ <
Vp(t)
N < φ
,
(3)
where q0 is the base rate of quitting, and α|
Vp(t)
N − 1/2|
is expected to be greater than 0 because the jury is more
likely to stop deliberating if it is not currently hung. If
they do stop deliberating at time t, then the time and
the final vote, V fp = Vp(Tdelib = t), are recorded.
To summarize, the influence model, as shown in Fig. 3,
involves three different transition probabilities: p, q, and
4FIG. 3. Schematic of the influence model. Solid lines corre-
spond to deterministic transitions, while dashed lines corre-
spond to probabilistic transitions. Jurors are first initialized
to have one of two opinions (for the plaintiff or defendant).
At each timestep, a random juror is picked and considers re-
evaluating their opinion with probability 1 − s, where s is
“stubbornness”. If they do re-evaluate, they pick the majority
opinion with probability p, and the minority with probability
1−p. At the end of each timestep, the jury stops deliberating
with probability q. See Eq. (1), (2), & (3) for definitions of s
and q.
s. These transition probabilities are constructed from a
total of four fitting parameters: µ, α, f , and p, and three
fixed parameters: b, the bias of the initial condition; ∆t,
the length of a time step; and q0, which are discussed
further in Methods. Fig. 2) shows that not only can
the model explain vote and time distributions, but it can
also explain the peaks in deliberation time near the crit-
ical fraction of voters V fp/N ≈ 0.3 and 0.6. This appears
to be due to important factors included in the influence
model: the instability of juries having 50/50 split deci-
sions, and the ability for juries to stop deliberating even
then they have not reached complete consensus (see Sup-
porting Information).
Variations of the full model
Having developed a model that explains the data bet-
ter than the simple null models, we construct variants
of the full model in order to identify which mechanisms
are most important for capturing the observed patterns.
First, we test whether herding affects jury trials by set-
ting p = 0.5 (Figs. 4 & 8). If p = 0.5, a juror would
have equal preference to pick the majority opinion as the
minority one. We see that the fit is significantly worse,
therefore herding appears to affect the outcomes of jury
trials. We next test the role of increasing stubbornness by
setting µeff = 0. Removing the increasing stubbornness
parameter, however, produces significantly poorer fits to
the data (Figs. 4 & 8). A similar conclusion is reached in
previous work that matches a model to election data in
several European countries [8]. Because highly disparate
datasets have similar conclusions about the importance of
increasing stubbornness, we believe it plays a fundamen-
tal role in opinion dynamics. Setting the stubbornness
FIG. 4. Comparison of Models. Normalized log-likelihood
functions for the null models and the influence model vari-
ants to illustrate comparison with the full influence model.
For each dataset indicated in the legend, log-likelihood func-
tions for these models were normalized by |log(Lfull)|, the log-
likelihood function of the full model, therefore models above
-1 explain the data better than the full influence model, while
those below -1 perform worse. (a) The relative fit of the one-
mode, two-mode, and two-timescale null models, along with
“no herding” model, in which p = 0.5, “no stubbornness”
model with µ = 0, “no vote dependence” model, in which
the model dynamics do not depend on the number of jurors
voting for the plaintiff, and the “no hung conditions” model,
in which jury dynamics do not depend on whether the jury
is currently hung. (b) In a zoomed-in graph, the influence
model variants seen in (a) perform worse than the full model.
probability s to a constant greater than 0 should only
generally decrease the timescale of the dynamics, pre-
sumably making the final vote distribution more similar
to the initial vote distribution, therefore in the interest
of space, we leave out further model variants of this type.
Finally, to better understand how the hung conditions af-
fect jury behavior, we fit a model with no dependence on
hanging: µeff(t) = µ and q(t) = q0+α|Vp(t)/N−1/2|. In
this “no hung conditions” variant, neither stubbornness
rate, nor the quitting rate, depends on whether the jury is
currently hung. The probability for the jury to end delib-
erations, however, still increases linearly with the amount
of consensus among jurors. To test the importance of the
current vote has on jury dynamics, we create a “no vote
dependence” variant in which µeff(t) = µ, and q is a fitted
constant. Both of these variants show poorer agreement
to the data compared to the full model (Figs. 4 & 9). We
finally tested removal of the hung conditions from either
the stubbornness rate (Eq. (2)) or the stopping proba-
bility (Eq. (3)), but not both. We find that removing
the hanging dependence of the stubbornness rate fits the
5data worse than removing the hanging dependence of the
stopping probability (Figs. 7 & 10). Hanging may there-
fore affect how juror opinions change more than it affects
how juries decide to end deliberations.
In summary, the full model agrees with data signifi-
cantly better than the null models: one-mode null model,
two-mode null model, and two-timescale null, as well
as variants that remove herding, stubbornness, hung-
conditions, and vote-dependent behavior.
Findings
What does the influence model suggest about jury de-
liberation? To begin to answer this question, we examine
the best-fit model parameters for the different datasets
(Tab. 1). Similar results are found when we look at crim-
inal data from Oregon as well (Tab. 2).
First, we see that the fitted stubbornness rate is usu-
ally much lower when juries are hung (fˆ < 1), which
suggests that, under hung conditions, jurors significantly
reduce the rate at which they stick to their current opin-
ion. Also, the positive estimated values of αˆ indicate
that juries are more likely to stop deliberating when they
reach near-consensus. Further, pˆ > 0.5 implies herding
occurs within the jury, and µˆ > 0 min−1 implies jurors
keep their most recent opinion with increasing stubborn-
ness.
In Fig. 5, we see that a parameter in the influence
model, α, follows the power law relation α ∼ (Ttrial)
−1/2,
which agrees with Fig. 1b because Tdelib ∼ α
−1 (Eq.
(3)). We propose a possible mechanism for the scaling re-
lationship Tdelib ∼ (Ttrial)
1/2 : over the course of a trial,
the amount of data juries will deliberate on, D, might
follow a random walk with a reflecting boundary condi-
tion at 0, which implies that αˆ−1 ∼ 〈Tdelib〉 ∼ 〈D〉 ∼
(Ttrial)
1/2 (see Supporting Information).
We also notice that, across all the data, the herding
probability, p, is highest when juries are smallest (Tabs. 1
& 2), while this value drops significantly for datasets with
larger N (p-value < 0.05 between any N = 6 dataset and
any N = 12 dataset). Previous studies on jury size [38],
found that larger juries become hung more frequently,
possibly because they have a minority opinion able to
better resist the majority. Our study provides evidence
of this explanation because larger juries have smaller p
values, and therefore jurors that are less likely to fol-
low the majority opinion. We should caution, however,
that influence is not necessarily homogenous across ju-
rors, which may affect our results.
DISCUSSION
We find that models in which jurors make decisions
independent from each other disagree with the data. On
the other hand, models in which jurors are influenced by
each other agree well, at least qualitatively, with the data.
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FIG. 5. The scaling of the stopping rate, αˆ ∼ qˆ (see Support-
ing Information), versus Ttrial showing that α ∼ (Ttrial)
−1/2
across CA, WA, and NE datasets. Error bars represent 90%
confidence intervals in the mean.
Importantly, we found best agreement from a model in
which jurors display tendencies to both follow one an-
other and also increasingly stick to their current opinion.
This type of behavior was also previously found to be
important for explaining voting patterns in elections [8],
which suggests that it may be a fundamental mechanism
of group decision-making.
Future work is necessary to better understand whether
stubbornness or influence can hurt or help collective wis-
dom. In a recent theoretical paper [20], correlations be-
tween jurors were found to sometimes create judgments
with lower accuracy than individual jurors when they
need to reach a simple majority. In contrast, sequential
voting, in which individuals base their decision on the
popularity of decisions in the past, has been shown to
significantly improve the wisdom of crowds [39, 40]. We
are not aware of any paper that discusses how stubborn-
ness can empirically help or hurt deliberation, nor does
our research directly address how stubbornness and/or
influence affects the quality of jury decisions.
Our work could also be extended by building more ac-
curate models and better addressing data heterogene-
ity. Most of the data is statistically significantly dif-
ferent from the model, based on the two-dimensional
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (p-value < 0.1) [41], pointing
to a need for more nuanced models to better explain the
data. Another, more fundamental problem, however, in
the datasets is heterogeneity: trials vary in complexity
and jurors differ across trials, which can affect how de-
cisions are reached. This may be addressed, however,
with controlled experiments in which several groups sep-
arately deliberate on the same, or very similar, informa-
tion. Data on how opinions change over time, as well as
the time for juries to reach a verdict can provide tanta-
lizing clues about the underlying mechanism of opinion
dynamics.
6Table 1: Model Parameter Descriptions and Fits
Parameter
Descriptions
p Herding
probability
µ Stubbornness
rate
f Reduces µ
when hung
α Controls rate
of ending
deliberation
Parameter Fits
Data Ttrial (Hrs) Num. Trials pˆ 90% Conf. αˆ (min
−1) 90% Conf. µˆ (min−1) 90% Conf. fˆ 90% Conf.
OR 6 – 101 0.956 0.94-0.98 0.0163 0.014-0.020 0.17 0.09-0.33 0.037 0.0-0.08
OR 12 – 560 0.873 0.85-0.89 0.012 0.010-0.014 0.070 0.05-0.09 0.028 0.0-0.09
CA 6 – 53 0.975 0.97-0.98 0.0080 0.007-0.009 0.042 0.03-0.07 1.0 0.9-1.0
CA 8 6-10 171 0.913 0.85-0.95 0.0154 0.014-0.017 0.37 0.2-0.7 0.11 0.0-0.2
CA 8 11-18 121 0.858 0.80-1.0 0.0104 0.010-0.012 0.49 0.2-1.0 0.24 0.0-0.6
CA 8 19-34 32 0.775 0.75-0.80 0.0065 0.005-0.008 0.50 0.40-0.67 0.011 0.0-0.02
CA 12 6-10 502 0.864 0.83-0.91 0.0146 0.014-0.016 0.63 0.4-1.0 0.22 0.1-0.4
CA 12 11-18 656 0.811 0.78-0.86 0.011 0.010-0.013 0.38 0.2-0.5 0.25 0.2-0.4
CA 12 19-34 402 0.812 0.80-0.85 0.0079 0.007-0.009 0.51 0.4-0.6 0.19 0.1-0.4
CA 12 35-61 111 0.747 0.71-0.80 0.0068 0.005-0.007 0.28 0.15-0.67 0.13 0.1-0.2
CA 12 62-110 42 0.765 0.75-0.78 0.0040 0.0035-0.0045 0.33 0.2-1.0 0.001 0.0-0.015
METHODS AND MATERIALS
Gathering Data
The jury data we study is taken from Multnomah
County, Oregon [27], San Francisco County, Califor-
nia [28], Thurston County, Washington, and Douglas
County, Nebraska [29, 30]. In the CA and OR datasets,
the deliberation time and final vote are known, which can
affect each other, but the OR dataset, unlike the other
datasets, does no record Ttrial. The CA dataset bins Ttrial
in days, but the WA and NE datasets record both hours
and days (roughly 4.5 hours per day in court), therefore
we convert each trial day in the CA data into 4 hours.
We removed all data where we did not have both the
trial time, deliberation time in hours, and final vote in
the CA data. Furthermore, we focus on trials in which
jurors only vote on one count to simplify our study (this
only removes 138 trials total) and the OR dataset only
records the most important count if multiple exist [27].
Once cleaned, we have 53 trials for CA 6, 338 trials for
CA 8, and 1726 trials for CA 12 out of 6482 total trials.
We do not know whether the kept data was unknowingly
biased, although the qualitative similarities suggest that
any bias should not significantly affect our results (Fig.
1). We also removed all data where we did not simulta-
neously know deliberation time and final vote in OR data
(only 4 trials were removed; once cleaned, there were 207
trials for OR 6 jury data, and 951 trials for OR 12 jury
data). Finally, we removed data where we did not si-
multaneously know both the trial time and deliberation
time in the WA and NE data. This removed 10 trials
for the WA dataset, and 21 trials for the NE dataset (in
the cleaned data, there were 141 and 135 trials, respec-
tively). All mean confidence intervals in the data come
from bootstrapping data 104 times.
Fitting The Data
In the OR dataset, some trials are criminal trials,
which have different rules about when juries are hung
(see Fig. 8 & Tab. 1) [42], therefore we primarily focus
on civil trials. In the CA dataset, all trials were civil tri-
als. In the WA and NE datasets, on the other hand, the
final vote was not recorded, therefore we did not attempt
to model the dynamics.
In the influence model, juror opinions are initially bino-
mially distributed, with each juror having a probability
b of an initially for-plaintiff opinion. The parameter b
was chosen such that the probability of simulated juries
initially voting for the plaintiff plus 1/2 the probabil-
ity of simulated juries being evenly split was equal to
Pr(V fp > N/2) in the dataset. This ensured that the fi-
nal distribution had a similar value for Pr(V fp > N/2).
In addition, we somewhat arbitrarily set the timestep in
simulations to be 1 minute, but simulations with signifi-
cantly smaller or larger timesteps (as small as 15 seconds,
or as large as 4 minutes) are not usually statistically sig-
nificantly different (p-value> 0.1 using the likelihood ra-
tio test [43]). An exception to this rule is CA12 with
Ttrial = 6 − 10 and 11 − 18 hours, where the timesteps
of 15 seconds and 1 minute are not statistically differ-
ent, but both are preferred over timesteps of 4 minutes
(p-values vary between 0.006 and 0.09). Furthermore, q0
is arbitrarily set to 0.3αˆ, but varying this value between
0.1αˆ−1.0αˆ similarly produces statistically equivalent fits
(p-values > 0.1). We cannot set this value to 0, how-
ever, because it would mean juries never stop deliberat-
ing when they are evenly split, which is in disagreement
with the data.
To find pˆ, αˆ, µˆ, and fˆ , we use maximum likelihood
estimation, and then use the log-likelihood function to
compare the quality of fits. Some values were predicted
to be nearly 0 in the model, even though they existed in
the data, therefore, we added a small base probability of
between 10−4 and 10−14 to the models with no signifi-
cant qualitative changes (all values shown are with a base
probability of 10−11). Finally, the distributions we used
to fit the influence models to the data were created from
1.6× 105 simulations per parameter value. There was an
inherent limit in the probability resolution (6×10−6), but
we do not believe this significantly affects our results. All
parameter confidence intervals come from bootstrapping
7and fitting the data 104 times.
Data Archival
All data is publicly available from the following refer-
ences: [27–29].
Acknowledgements
Our work is supported by the Army Research Office
under contract W911NF-15-1-0142. KB would like to
thank Nicholas Pace and Walter Fontana for enlightening
discussions.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION (SI)
How Deliberation Time is Affected by the Final Vote
It might not be intuitive why the deliberation time,
Tdelib, is highest when jurors are near consensus in both
the data and the influence model, while Tdelib is lower
when jurors are evenly split (see Figs. 1 & 2 in the main
text). In this section, we present a simple Markov chain
model to better understand this finding.
We find that the fraction of jurors voting for the plain-
tiff, V fp/N = 1/2 is rare, as seen in Fig. 2a in the
main text. This finding is likely related to the influence
model becoming the Majority Voter Model (MVM) when
α = µ = 0, i.e., when juries do not stop deliberating and
there is no jury stubbornness, because Vp(t)/N = 1/2 is
known to be unstable past a critical point in the MVM
when the influence of neighbors changes from weak (and
opinions are evenly split) to strong (and there is near-
unanimous agreement) [44, 45]. Using this numerical
finding, we create a similar, but much simpler, model
in which the number of jurors voting for the plaintiff is
represented as a node in a Markov chain, and there is a
bias for juries to have greater agreement (see Fig. 6).
In the model, juries begin evenly split (Vp(0)/N = 1/2)
but can transition to a new state, Vp(1)/N ± 1/N , with
probability (1− s′)/2. Once jurors reach this new state,
they can achieve greater consensus, Vp(1)/N±2/N , with
probability (1 − s′)/2, or stay in the current state. This
pattern can continue until juries stop deliberating with
probability q′ at each timestep.
Recall that, in the influence model seen in the main
text, a juror will choose not to re-evaluate their opin-
ion with probability s, and even if they do re-evaluate,
they may choose to keep their original opinion, there-
fore it is reasonable for self-loops to exist in the Markov
chain model. That said, because s is often less than 1,
and p > 1/2, it is reasonable to assume that opinions
develop stronger pluralities over time, ergo the Markov
chain model captures many qualitative features of the
influence model.
Starting from time t = 1, we find that the probability
a jury is evenly split by the time they stop deliberating
at time t is
Pr(V fp/N = 1/2, t) = q
′(1− q′)t−1(s′)t (4)
which implies that
Pr(1/2) =
q′s′
1− s′(1 − q′)
(5)
and the probability the jury stops deliberating with an
opinion V fp/N = 1/2 + 1/N (or equivalently V
f
p/N =
1/2− 1/N) at time t is
(1-s')/2(1-s')/2 (1-s')/2(1-s')/2
q'
(1+s')/2s'(1+s')/2
 Vp/N = 1/2  (Vp+1)/N (Vp-1)/N
FIG. 6. A Markov model that qualitatively describes the dy-
namics of the influence model seen in the main text. We
assume states change as a Markov chain, therefore with prob-
ability s′ we remain in state Vp(t)/N = 1/2, but transition to
Vp(t)/N = 1/2±1/N with probability
1−s′
2
. Once we are at a
new state, we either transition to Vp(t)/N = 1/2± 2/N with
the same probability or stay in the current state. Finally,
with probability q′, juries stop deliberating.
Pr(V fp/N = 1/2 + 1/N, t) = Pr(1/2− 1/N, t) = q
′(1− q′)t−1
{[
1 + s′
2
]t−1
− (s′)t−1
}
, (6)
and the probability over all time is
Pr(1/2± 1/N) =
q′(1 − s′)
[(q′ − 1)s′ + 1][(q′ − 1)s′ + q′ + 1]
,
(7)
where we use ± to emphasize that the probabilities for
V fp/N = 1/2+1/N and V
f
p/N = 1/2−1/N are the same.
Using Pr(1/2, t) and Pr(1/2 ± 1/N, t), we can also find
the mean deliberation time conditioned on the final vote:
8〈Tdelib(1/2)〉 =
s′q′
[1− s′(1 − q′)]2
(8)
and
〈Tdelib(1/2± 1/N)〉 =
q′
{
(q′ − 1)2s′3 − [(q′ − 2)q′ + 3]s′ + 2
}
[(q′ − 1)s′ + 1]2[(q′ − 1)s′ + q′ + 1]2
, (9)
where 〈.〉 is the average. If s′ → 0 (in other words,
Vp(t)/N = 1/2 is very unstable), then we find that
Pr(1/2) = s′q′, (10)
and
Pr(1/2± 1/N) =
q′
q′ + 1
, (11)
In comparison
〈Tdelib(1/2)〉 = q
′s′, (12)
and
〈Tdelib(1/2± 1/N)〉 =
2q′
(q′ + 1)2
. (13)
The probability that deliberation stops at V fp/N = 1/2
is small, but so is the time that this deliberation would
subsequently take. In comparison, V fp/N = 1/2± 1/N is
more likely, but mean deliberation time is subsequently
higher. If we continue to V fp/N = 1/2±2/N , Tdelib is ex-
pected to further increase because it takes at a minimum
number of timesteps to reach the state. In short, the
Markov chain model helps explain why Tdelib is low when
the jury is evenly split, even though the probability for
a jury to be evenly split is low as well. Furthermore, the
Markov chain model helps explain why deliberation in-
creases with greater consensus, at least until V fp/N ≈ 0.3
and V fp/N ≈ 0.6, when quitting rates substantially in-
crease in the influence model, therefore lowering Tdelib
again.
Random Walk Stopping Rate
If we assume that the amount of information jurors ac-
cumulate is D, which we assume follows a random walk
with a reflective boundary at D = 0 (people cannot have
negative information), and the amount of time users de-
liberate scales as Tdelib ∼ D, then α
−1 ∼ D, where α is
proportional to the quitting rate in the influence model.
To better understand how D affects the dynamics, recall
that
Pr(D|T ) =
(
T + 1
(T +D − 1)/2
)
D
T + 1
, (14)
where T is the number of timesteps. Taking T to be
large, using the Sterling’s formula, and dropping non-
leading terms,
Pr(D|T ) ≈
2D
T
e−(D
2/T ). (15)
This immediately implies that 〈D〉 ∼ T 1/2. T is not, as
of yet, explicitly defined, because T is still the number
of timesteps and not an actual time. We can, however,
set T ∼ Ttrial, and, because Tdelib ∼ D, Tdelib ∼ T
1/2 ∼
T
1/2
trial, in agreement with what we find empirically, there-
fore αˆ ∼ T
−1/2
trial .
Alternative Jury Models
We mention in the main text that removing all hung
conditions in the herding and stubbornness model will
produce a poorer fit (see Fig. 4 in the main text and
Fig. 7). To better understand why this is the case, we
separately remove the dependence of the quitting rate,
q, and stubbornness rate, µeff(t), on whether the jury is
hung. In the former case, we see a small change in the
likelihood function, but in the latter case, the likelihood
function has a more significant drop. This suggests that
jurors depend more on changing their stubbornness rate
than changing their quitting rate when they avoid hang-
ing.
Oregon Criminal Cases
In this section, we compare data and fits for criminal
and civil cases in Oregon. The reason we separate the
data is both because the requirements for a verdict are
different (ten out of twelve jurors are need to agree in-
stead of nine out of twelve, although five out of six still
need to agree in six-person juries), and the motivations
for reaching a decision may be different. Overall, we find
quantitatively similar findings between criminal and civil
cases.
First, we compare OR 6 and OR 12 attributes seen in
Fig. 2 of the main text (Fig. 8). We find that 〈Tdelib〉 is
higher for OR 6 criminal cases compared to civil cases,
but the trend is not as clear for the OR 12 cases (Fig.
9FIG. 7. A comparison between the normalized log-likelihood
functions of three model variants. −1 corresponds to the full
model, and the more negative the log-likelihood, the worse
the fit. The no hung conditions model creates consistently
poorer fits than the full model, but if q is independent of
whether the jury is hung and µeff(t) is Eq. (2) in the main
text (“No hung stop”), the fit is very close to the full model,
although this assumes, unnaturally, that juries with evenly
split verdicts never stop deliberating. Instead, when we let
µeff(t) = µ (“No hung stubbornness”), the fit is roughly as
poor as the model without any hung conditions.
8a). That said, in all cases we see that 〈Tdelib〉 is higher
when there is greater disagreement among jurors. We
also find that juries are commonly found to reach a ver-
dict and hung juries are rare (Fig. 8b). Finally, we see
that Pr(Tdelib) is almost exactly the same for both civil
and criminal cases.
Next we compare the fits for civil and criminal cases.
Overall, we find that civil and criminal cases fit each
model similarly well (Fig. 9). For example, the one-
mode and two-mode null models give some of the worst
fits, and the two-timescale model was the best null model,
although it was still worse than the full influence model.
Furthermore, removing either herding or stubbornness
from the full influence model produces a much worse fit,
while removing the vote dependence or hung conditions
has a much smaller effect. We also see the same quali-
tative trends when we separately remove the dependence
of the stubbornness rate or quitting rate on whether the
jury is hung (Fig. 10). In both the criminal and civil
cases, removing the stubbornness rate’s dependence on
whether a jury is hung creates a significantly worse fit
compared to removing the quitting rate’s dependence.
FIG. 8. OR 6 and OR 12 Data attributes for Criminal and
Civil Cases. (a) The mean deliberation time peaks when the
V fp/N ≈ 0.3 and 0.6, where V
f
p/N is the fraction of jurors vot-
ing for the plaintiff (or voting guilty in criminal cases). (b)
The distribution of V fp/N shows peaks when V
f
p/N ≥ φ or
V fp/N ≤ 1−φ, where φ is the thresholds between which juries
hang (φ = 0.75 for civil cases and 0.833 for criminal cases)
[27, 31]. (c) The complimentary cumulative distribution of de-
liberation times is heavy-tailed across datasets. Data is taken
from [27] and error bars represent 90% confidence intervals in
the mean.
Correlations Between Jury Attributes
In this section, we discuss correlations between various
attributes, in order to better understand how to model
jury dynamics. First, we look at how the jury size affects
the deliberation time (Fig. 11), and notice very little
correlation between the two. This contrasts with many
models of opinion dynamics in which deliberation time
strongly correlates with system size [32, 33]. Next, we
compare how the trial time depends on the final vote
(Fig. 12). Interestingly, although both the trial time
and the final vote strongly affect the deliberation time
(Fig. 2 in the main text), neither are strongly correlated
with each other. We use this property to find separate
mechanisms for the correlation between each attribute
and deliberation time.
Finally, we plot the probability a typical voter will
vote for the plaintiff (or vote guilty in criminal cases),
Pr(Outlier For Plaintiff), versus the vote of all the other
jurors for OR 12 (Fig. 13). We find a strong corre-
lation between the two in civil cases and criminal cases,
therefore juror opinions are not independent, which gives
strong evidence that herding may exist in juries. We
find Pr(Outlier For Plaintiff) by determining how many
trials end with verdict V fp = V
f
p,N−1 + 1, correspond-
ing to the outlier juror voting for the plaintiff, and how
many trials end with V fp = V
f
p,N−1, corresponding to the
outlier juror voting for the defendant. The probability,
Pr(Outlier For Plaintiff), is simply
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Table 2: Model Parameter Fits: OR 6 & OR 12 Criminal Cases
Parameter Fits
Data Ttrial (Hrs) Num. Trials pˆ 90% Conf. αˆ (min
−1) 90% Conf. µˆ (min−1) 90% Conf. fˆ 90% Conf.
OR 6 Crim. – 104 0.961 0.92-1.0 0.0181 0.016-0.022 0.36 0.25-0.50 0.045 0.0-0.1
OR 12 Crim. – 374 0.904 0.89-0.91 0.0116 0.010-0.014 0.018 0.01-0.05 0.32 0.0-0.6
FIG. 9. Comparison of Models for OR 6 and OR 12 civil
and criminal cases. Normalized log-likelihood functions for
the null models and the influence model variants to illustrate
comparison with the full influence model. For each dataset
indicated in the legend, log-likelihood functions for these mod-
els were normalized by |log(Lfull)|, the log-likelihood function
of the full model, therefore models above -1 explain the data
better than the full influence model, while those below -1 ex-
plain the data worse. (a) The relative fit of the one-mode,
two-mode, and two-timescale null models, along with the “no
herding” model, in which p = 0.5, “no stubbornness” model
with µ = 0, “no vote dependence” model, in which the model
dynamics do not depend on the number of jurors voting for the
plaintiff (or voting guilty in criminal cases), and the “no hung
conditions” model, in which jury dynamics do not depend on
whether the jury is currently hung. (b) In a zoomed-in graph,
the influence model variants seen in (a) perform worse than
the full model.
Pr(Outlier For Plaintiff) =
Pr
(
V fp,N−1 + 1
)
Pr
(
V fp,N−1 + 1
)
+ Pr
(
V fp,N−1
) . (16)
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